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Abstract—Data process unit (DPU) is a typical embedded
system. It is widely used in space applications to collect data
from sensors, process data and send the data to its upper master
computer. In this paper, we use the BIP framework to model
and validate a DPU system of a real space application. We first
build the system model including the control software, hardware
and the environment. Validation is by extensive simulation of a
monitored system obtained as the composition of the DPU model
with monitors. A monitor checks a requirement by continuously
sensing the state of the model and reaching an error state
if the requirement is violated. We checked fault-tolerance for
different fault models and detected several errors that under
some conditions, could correspond to real implementation errors.
I. Introduction
Data process unit (DPU) is a typical embedded system. It is
widely used in space applications. DPUs are mainly placed in
the middle layer of a space system and are used to obtain data
from their lower sensors, process data and send data to their
upper master computer. For DPU systems the main concerns
are 1) whether a operation is finished in the predefined time; 2)
whether an operation is executed according to the predefined
protocol; 3) whether the data returned by the DPU conforms to
the specification. In this paper, we use a DPU system obtained
from a real space application as a case study.
The system structure of the case is shown in Fig. 1. There
are four sensors, a master computer, a multiplexer and a DPU.
Sensor1 is connected to the DPU directly, while sensor2,
sensor3, sensor4 and the master computer are connected to
the DPU through the multiplexer, which is controlled by the
DPU. There are two interrupts used in the DPU software:
the synchronous interrupt, INT0, and the serial port interrupt,
INTCOM, which has higher priority than INT0. Any data
arriving at the serial port (the UART box in Fig. 1) leads to an
INTCOM interrupt and every rising edge of the synchronous
signal leads to an INT0 interrupt. There are three routines
in the DPU software, respectively: the main routine, which
is used to do the initialization work, the INTCOM handling
routine and the INT0 handling routine.
The informal requirements of the software can be described
using Fig. 2. The cycle length of the synchronous signal is
150ms. For every rising edge of the signal, there is an INT0
interrupt, which in turn triggers an INT0 handling routine.
In the INT0 handling routine, the data of sensor1 should be
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Fig. 1. The system structure
latched and read. 4.5ms after the rising edge, the master com-
puter will send a data-request command to the DPU (through
the multiplexer), which triggers an INTCOM interrupt. In the
INTCOM handling routine, the program executes the following
sequence in 13ms: 1) latch and read the data of sensor1; 2)
control the multiplexer to select sensor2 (sensor3, sensor4,
resp.), send the data-request command and receive the data
sent back by sensor3 (sensor3, sensor4, resp.); 3) process and
pack the data obtained from sensor1 to sensor4; 4) control the
multiplexer to select the master computer and send the packed
data.
13msrising edge
4.5ms
150ms
Fig. 2. The timing diagram
Besides the requirements mentioned in the previous para-
graph, we have three functional requirements: (a) the master
computer should be selected by the DPU, when it sends the
data-request command to the DPU; (b) sensor1 provides the
latch and read functions, these functions should be called
according to a specific protocol; (c) the DPU should send
the “right” data to the master computer1. There are also two
1For the formal description of “right” data, please refer to the technical
report [1].
additional requirements expressing real-time constraints: (d)
the INT0 handling routine should be finished in 4.5ms and (e)
the INTCOM handling routine should be finished in 13ms.
In order the validate the DPU system, we use the BIP
framework [2]. The main work flow is shown in Fig. 3. First,
the system, including hardware, software and environment, is
modeled as a BIP component. Then all the requirements are
modeled by monitor components. Finally, after composing the
DPU system model and the monitors, we use BIP tools for
validation.
In the flow, it is essential to come up with an adequate
and faithful model. This involves the following tasks: decide
which parts of the system should be modeled, decompose
the system, choose the abstraction level, model application-
specific features in BIP, such as the use of shared variable.
Fig. 3. The work flow
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
gives a short introduction of the BIP framework. In section
III we provide an overview of the BIP model of the DPU
system. Section IV presents the validation phase and section
V concludes the paper.
II. The BIP Framework
BIP (Behavior, Interaction, Priority) is a component frame-
work intended to rigorous system design [3]. It allows the
construction of composite hierarchically structured compo-
nents from atomic components characterized by their behavior
and their interface. Components are composed by layered
application of interactions and of priorities.
A. BIP Concepts
Atomic components are finite-state automata extended with
variables and ports. Variables are used to store local data.
Ports are action names, and may be associated with variables.
They are used for interaction with other components. States
denote control locations at which the components await for
interaction. A transition is a step, labeled by a port, from
a control location to another. It has associated a guard and
an action, that are respectively, a Boolean condition and a
computation defined on local variables. In BIP, data and their
transformations are written in C/C++. For example, Fig. 8
provides a graphical representation of an atomic component
used for the modeling of the DPU case study.
Interactions express synchronization constraints between
ports (actions) of the composed components. Interactions are
described in BIP as the combination of two types of elemen-
tary protocols: rendez-vous to express strong symmetric syn-
chronization and broadcast to express triggered asymmetric
synchronization. Interactions are defined using connectors, that
is, sets of ports plus additional information. Within connectors,
every port is typed either as synchron or as trigger. Trigger
ports are used to initiate broadcast, that is, any subset of ports
containing at least one trigger port denote a valid interaction
of the connector. Rendez-vous synchronizations are obtained
on connectors where all the ports are synchrons. For such
connectors, the only valid interaction is the maximal one,
that is, the whole set of ports. Finally, connectors provide
mechanisms for dealing with data associated to (ports of)
interacting components. Every interaction has a guard, that
is, an enabling condition and an action, that is, an update
(data transfer) function, operating on data associated to ports
participating in the interaction. For example, Fig. 6 illustrates
several connectors used for the composition of the top-level
DPU component. Circles (resp. triangles) denote synchron
(resp. trigger) ports.
Priorities are used to filter amongst possible interactions.
They are expressed as conditional priority rules between two
interactions, respectively a low-priority and a high-priority
one. Whenever the condition (on the state of the system) holds,
if the two interactions are enabled then only the high priority
interaction is allowed for execution. In practice, priorities steer
system evolution so as to meet performance requirements e.g.
to express scheduling policies.
The choices made in the definition of BIP are paramount.
More information about the underlying concepts and the
operational semantics of BIP can be found in [2], [4]. In partic-
ular, BIP provides separation of concerns between behavioral
and architectural aspects in modeling. For BIP components,
architecture is meaningfully defined as the combination of in-
teractions and priorities. Component architecture can therefore
be easily decoupled, understood and analyzed independently of
the associated behavior. Moreover, [5] presents a study about
expressivity of BIP and related component-based frameworks.
It is shown that the combination of interactions and priorities
confers BIP a universal form of expressiveness, actually not
matched by any other existing formalism. Furthermore, besides
theoretical studies, expressivity of BIP has been confirmed by
the very numerous translations defined from existing models of
computation and domain-specific languages into BIP. A survey
and pointers to relevant publications are available on the BIP
web site [6].
B. BIP Tools
The BIP toolbox [6] includes a rich set of tools for mod-
eling, code generation, execution, analysis (both static and
on-the-fly), transformations of models. An overview of the
toolbox is given in Fig. 4.
The toolbox provides a dedicated modeling language for de-
scribing BIP components. It is a user-friendly textual language
which provides syntactic constructs for describing components
conforming to the formal framework. The BIP language
leverages on C-style variables and data type declarations,
expressions and statements, and provides additional structural
syntactic constructs for defining component behavior, spec-
ifying the coordination through connectors, and describing
the priorities. Moreover, it provides additional constructs for
dealing with parametric descriptions (i.e., where the same
component occur replicated in many places) as well as for
expressing timing constraints associated with behavior.
Fig. 4. An overview of the BIP toolbox
The toolbox provides front-end tools for editing and parsing
of BIP descriptions, as well as for generating intermediate
models, followed by code generation (in C++). Intermediate
models can be subject to various model transformations fo-
cusing on construction of optimized models for respectively
sequential [7] and distributed execution [8]. Back-end tools
include specific runtimes for analysis (through simulation)
and efficient execution on machines with different charac-
teristics and OS support (e.g., real-time, mono/multi-thread,
single/multi-core).
Validation of BIP models can be achieved by using static
and/or runtime validation techniques. Static validation tech-
niques are provided by the D-Finder tool [9]. D-Finder
implements state-of-the-art compositional methods [10] for
computing invariants for systems consisting of interacting
components. Invariants are safe (over) approximations of the
set of reachable states of the system and can be used to
prove safety requirements. In the case of BIP components,
invariants computed are conjunctions of local invariants for
atomic components and interaction invariants characterizing
the interactions glue. Local component invariants are generated
by static (and individual) analysis of atomic components.
Interaction invariants are generated from abstractions of the
interacting components and the interactions glue.
Runtime validation techniques available for BIP are based
on construction and execution of monitored systems. Histor-
ically, this validation approach is oriented towards finding
errors rather than proving their absence from designs2. This
approach has been adapted for BIP components as explained
in [11]. It consists in constructing an executable model of the
designed system together with monitors responsible for evalu-
ation of safety requirements. Monitors are atomic components
that sense the system state (through interaction with system’s
components) and react by moving to error states whenever
the safety requirement is violated i.e., if an inconsistent state
is reached or an invalid sequence of interactions has been
executed, etc. The BIP framework provides native support
for building and running executable models for monitored
systems.
III. Overview of the BIP Model
The hierarchy of the system with monitors is shown in
Fig. 5. The overall structure of the BIP model for the system
is shown in Fig. 6. The DPU control software is furthermore
decomposed into six subcomponents as shown in Fig. 7. We
adopt the following decomposition principles:
• Distinguish two levels separating hardware from soft-
ware. For hardware, we have 6 components: one com-
ponent for each sensor, one for the multiplexer and one
for the master computer. At the DPU software level,
decomposition follows on the software structure: besides
the components for each interrupt routine, we have the
serial port component, the scheduler component, which
is used to accept the interrupts and schedule the routines,
and the shared-variable component.
• Adopt an adequate abstraction level. For example, sen-
sor1 is a single microcomputer. It can be decomposed
to subcomponents as we do for the DPU. Nevertheless,
our modeling focuses only on two services it provides,
i.e., lock and read. Therefore, an atomic component is
sufficient.
• The decomposition follows the functionality. For example,
the serial port component (shown in Fig. 8) consists of
two subcomponents because it provides two functions:
send data and receive data, each of which is modeled by
a subcomponent.
Generally speaking, the ports of a component represent
the services or events the component provides or uses. For
example, sensor1 provides two services. Hence, it has two
corresponding ports. An important issue in identifying ports
is to decide the type of synchronization for ports: strong
synchronization (drawn as a bullet in figures) or broadcast
(drawn as a triangle in figures). Notice that ports modeling
a service used or provided as well as tick ports are involved
in strong synchronizations. On the contrary, ports used for
sending messages which may not be received or emitting an
interrupt signal, initiate broadcasts.
The behavior of a component is modeled by a finite state
automaton extended with data and functions written in C/C++.
2actually, stronger guarantees on correctness can be obtained by combining
simulation with statistical techniques as in statistical model-checking
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Fig. 7. The BIP model of DPU
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Fig. 8. The BIP model of the serial port
For example, the receiving part of the serial port is shown in
Fig. 9. Port recv is used to receive data from the multiplexer,
port check is used for the routines to check whether there is
a new data arrived, port send for the routines to read the data
of the serial port and port INTCOM for emitting the interrupt
signal. The initial state is IDLE. When it receives a data from
the multiplexer, it will issue an INTCOM interrupt signal. In
the automaton, we know that 1) if a newly arrived data is not
read then the serial port cannot receive a data; 2) if a routine
does not check whether there is a new data before reading the
serial port, it may read an old data.
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Fig. 9. The receiving part of serial port
There are two main lessons we learnt from the constructions
of models:
• behavior should not necessarily capture all the implemen-
tation details. Take the serial port for example. At first, we
want to build a model based on the hardware structure of
serial port. Later, we find that it is too complex to follow
and it is not necessary for our case since the modeling
of serial port is not the key concern. Finally, by reading
the specification of serial port and guiding by the actual
needs, we build a simplified and correct model for the
serial port.
• modeling choices must not add irrelevant constraints
into the design. For example, components should not be
unexpectedly blocked, especially for those modeling envi-
ronment. Take the component of the master computer for
example. This component should emit the synchronous
signals every 150ms. The first version of the component
may be blocked if the DPU does not return the data
in time. Although this deadlock can be found through
simulation or verification, in real implementations this
situation cannot happen.
For the case study, we construct 13 atomic components and
3 composite components. The BIP model is about 1100 lines
of BIP code. The total development time is about three weeks
including learning the use of BIP language and associated
tools.
IV. Overview of the Validation
Validation involves three main steps, respectively, 1) build-
ing a set of environment models, 2) building monitors to
express functional requirements, 3) composing the system
model and the monitors, and run the simulation BIP tool.
A. Environment modeling
The system may always behave correctly for perfect sce-
narios. In order to evaluate correctness we need to design a
set of potentially faulty environment models. In our case, we
design four models for the master computer:
1) PMC: a perfect master computer which has perfect
timing and does not miss signals (as shown in Fig. 2);
2) NPMC1: a non-perfect master computer that has perfect
timing but may miss arbitrary signals3;
3) NPMC2: a non-perfect master computer that has perfect
timing and may miss signals, but cannot miss both
signals in one cycle (as shown in Fig. 10);
4) NPMC3: a non-perfect master computer that has perfect
timing and may miss signals, but cannot miss two
adjacent signals;
B. Requirements modeling
As mentioned in section I, there are five functional require-
ments we want to validate. Each requirement is modeled by
a monitor component. Typically, a monitor contains one or
more states. Reaching error states means that the requirement
is violated. In this case study, there are two monitor design
principles: 1) The monitor should not influence the execution
of the system; 2) The monitor should monitor every event it
needs – if needed, we should add specially designed ports to
the system under investigation.
Not influencing the system involves basically two condi-
tions: the monitors should not change the inner state of the
system neither block (i.e., restrict) the execution of the system
by synchronization. For the first condition, the monitors should
only read the data of the system – writing is forbidden.
There are two ways to ensure the second condition. We take
3There are two signals that may be lost: the rising edge of synchronous
signal and the data-request command of the master computer.
Fig. 10. The non-perfect master computer NPMC2
for example the monitor for checking if the execution time
of INT0 handling routine exceeds the predefined time (as
shown in Fig. 11). All events the monitor observes should
be connected by broadcasts, such as the connectors between
INT and all.invoke0 and between RETI and all.ret0. The ports
on the system model side should be triggers. However, if the
port is used for strong synchronization (such as the tick port
used to synchronize time between the monitor and the system)
then the port should be enabled on all monitor states except
for the error states. In other word, every state except for the
error states has a self-cycle labelled by the port.
In order to illustrate the second principle, we take NPMC2
for example. The BIP model of NPMC2 is shown in Fig. 10.
NPMC2 would miss signals that are modeled by two tran-
sitions labelled missINT0 and missINTCOM. At first, these
two ports are inner ports that cannot be observed by other
components. Nonetheless, during the construction of right data
monitor, we found that the monitor should perceive the events
of missing signals. Hence, we export these two ports.
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Fig. 11. The INT0 handling routine execution time monitor
C. Validation results
The system model together with monitors form a BIP model
as well. The generation of a executable simulation program
includes two steps. First, the model is compiled into C++
code using the BIP compiler tools. Second, the C++ code is
linked with the BIP engine and compiled into an executable
program. Simulation of the model is done by executing the
above program.
Reaching an error state would usually cause a global dead-
lock. For example in Fig. 11, if the monitor reaches state
ERROR, since there is no tick that can be triggered, the system
time cannot advance, which results in a global deadlock. This
would reduce the effectiveness, because only one bug can be
found during one simulation run. In order to improve this, we
modified monitors in order to allow the system to resume its
execution whenever a violation is found.
We perform validation of the five functional requirements,
for each fault model. The results are summarized in Tab.I.
TABLE I
Validation result
PMC NPMC1 NPMC2 NPMC3
Multiplexer Monitor (a)
√ √ √ √
Latch instruction Monitor (b)
√ √ √ √
Right data Monitor (c)
√ × × ×
INT0 routine time Monitor (d)
√ √ √ √
INTCOM routine time Monitor (e)
√ √ √ √
Simulation time 10m 10m 10m 10m
Number of simulated cycles 6627 6627 6900 7746
After analyzing the traces generated by the simulation, a
counterexample for requirement (c) using faulty environment
model NPMC1 is shown in Fig. 12. In the trace, the data-
request command of cycle 1 and the INT0 interrupt of cycle
2 are lost. S 11 to S 16 are the values of sensor1 at the
corresponding time positions. The expected return value is
S 16 − S 13 but the DPU returns S 13 − S 11.
9 9 9 9
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9 9
Fig. 12. A counterexample
V. Conclusion
Data process unit (DPU) is a typical embedded system. It is
used in space applications to collect data from sensors, process
data and send the data to its upper master computer. In this
paper, we use the BIP framework to model and validate a DPU
system obtained from a real space application. We first build
the system model including the control software, hardware and
the environment. In order to do validation, we devise several
fault models and for each requirement, we build a monitor
component. After composing the system model and monitors
together, we use BIP tool chain to do the validation based on
simulation. We found several bugs in the design, at different
stages of the development.
This experiment perfectly illustrates the expressive power
and the modeling and validation facilities provided by the
BIP framework. The models developed have been shared
with industrial designers of DPU applications. The feedback
obtained is particularly positive: the BIP models are clear,
understandable and useful. BIP models definitely help to clar-
ify design issues and to identify and correct rapidly potential
design problems.
The work on this case study is currently being extended
in two directions. First, we are investigating the applicability
of more powerful verification techniques and tools, such as
compositional generation of invariants [10]. Contrary to sim-
ulation, these techniques are computationally much expensive
but they can provide stronger guarantees about the correctness
of safety properties. The second direction concerns implemen-
tation. We are planning to adapt the BIP code generator and
to develop a domain-specific extension allowing to produce
the low-level implementation of the DPU software on specific
processors.
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